CPLR 204(b): Toll Will Not Be Granted Where Colorable Basis for Arbitration Is Lacking by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 43 
Number 2 Volume 43, October 1968, Number 2 Article 7 
December 2012 
CPLR 204(b): Toll Will Not Be Granted Where Colorable Basis for 
Arbitration Is Lacking 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1968) "CPLR 204(b): Toll Will Not Be Granted Where Colorable Basis for Arbitration 
Is Lacking," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 43 : No. 2 , Article 7. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol43/iss2/7 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE 2 - LIMITATrIONS OF TImE
CPLR 204(b).: Toll will not be granted where
colorable basis for arbitration is lacking.
CPLR 204(b) tolls the statute of limitations for the period
between a demand for arbitration and a final determination that
there is no obligation to arbitrate. Section (b) is not explicitly
qualified to apply only to well-founded, controvertible, demands
for arbitration, but reason dictates that there be some such quali-
fied use of the provision.
In Watkins v. Holiday Drive-Ur-Self, Inc.,' the court, since it
found that there was no basis for believing that arbitration was
available, refused to toll the statute of limitations. The plaintiff's
actions, in demanding arbitration, are probably explained by a
mistaken belief that the defendant's insurance carrier was a signa-
tory to an agreement providing for arbitration.
The bar should thus note that a demand for arbitration must
be made with care for if it is legally an empty request, made
either through mistake or as a tactic to increase one's time to
deal with a case, it will have no effect on the running of the
statute of limitations. Thus, an attorney who allows the statute
to expire during such a course of action may be subject to the
danger of a malpractice suit.
CPLR 214: "Continuing practice" theory applied
in attorney malpractice cases.
Generally, in a malpractice case, the statute of limitations
runs from the time that the malpractice occurs 2 rather than from
the time when it is discovered. However, various exceptions to
the general rule have evolved.3  For example, in the medical
field, the "continuing practice" theory has received Court of Ap-
peals' endorsement. 4  According to this theory, if treatment con-
tinues after the actual malpractice, the statute runs from the
date of the last treatment. The rationale is that, where treat-
ment occurs on more than an occasional -visit and extends over a
period of time, the relationship between patient and doctor must
129 App. Div. 2d 810, 287 N.Y.S.2d 730 (3d Dep't 1968).
2 Conklin v. Draper, 229 App. Div. 227, 241 N.Y.S. 529 (lst Dep't),
aff'd weithout opinion, 254 N.Y. 620, 173 N.E. 892 (1930); see 1 WEINsTIN,
KoRN & MILER, NE w YORK Civm PRAarcr 1214.18 (1966) for a discus-
sion of the problems raised when there are unknown injuries.3 See McLaughlin, Annual Survey of New York Law: Civil Practice,
14 SYRAcusE: L. REv. 347, 353-54 (1962).4 Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237
N.Y.S.2d 319 (1962).
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